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Proportionality and the Social Benefits of Discovery:
Out of Sight and Out of Mind?
Stephen B. Burbank*
In a paper on the "Law and Economics of Proportionality in
Discovery," Jonah Gelbach and Bruce Kobayashi do a superb job
"elaborat[ing], from an analytical perspective, the economic
considerations that arise from the [proportionality] standard as
written."1  The paper is as refreshing as it is analytically acute.
Claims concerning the private and social costs of discovery have
dominated the discovery retrenchment campaign narrative that
gained traction following the 1976 Pound Conference.2 These
claims pay little, if any, attention to discovery's private and social
benefits.3 Indeed, not even the methodologically sound empirical
* David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. This brief comment is based on remarks made at a
panel on the future of discovery sponsored by the Section of Litigation of the
Association of American Law Schools on January 3, 2015. I appreciate the helpful
suggestions of Tess Wilkinson-Ryan.
1. Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law & Economics of
Proportionality in Discovery 19 (Univ. of Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research
Paper No. 15-1), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id=
2551520.
2. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1588-89, 1598 (2014)
[hereinafter Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform]; Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas
0. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839,
1864-66 (2014). The potential catalyzing effect of the 1976 Pound Conference
suggests the usefulness of periodic conferences to bolster support for
retrenchment, as does the 2010 Duke Conference. See Stephen B. Burbank &
Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional
Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1593-94 (2015) [hereinafter Burbank & Farhang,
Federal Court Rulemaking] (discussing the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation
organized by the Advisory Committee, which has been repeatedly invoked as
cover for some of the recent discovery amendments).
3. See, e.g., Linda Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences of Unfounded Rulemaking, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994); see also Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay
Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV.
1085, 1102-16, 1122-23 (2012) ("The very questions implicated by the
cost-and-delay narrative-that is, whether civil justice is worth the burdens that it
entails-are not questions susceptible to empirical verification. This limitation
helps to explain the persuasiveness of the cost-and-delay narrative in the face of
empirical data that seems to contradict it."). For experimental evidence that "one
can get the public to focus on those issues one thinks are important by never
mentioning other issues," see Baruch Fischoff, Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein,
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studies that have consistently undermined the costs story rigorously
engage the question of benefits.4 Such a skewed view likely enabled
the chair of the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee, without
apparent irony, repeatedly to invoke discovery amendments that
were proposed in 20135 as an important contribution to the goal of
6access to court.
Observing that "one effect of the partial externalization of
litigation costs is to generate litigation activity whose aggregate
social costs exceed its aggregate social benefits," the authors quickly
add that "this tendency to overuse the legal system may be offset by
differences between the private and social benefits of litigation.",
7
The authors refer to statutes in which Congress provides "features
such as damage multipliers and fee-shifting, which encourage
litigation of statutorily created causes of action," suggesting that they
Fault Trees: Sensitivity of Estimated Failure Probabilities to Problem
Representation, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 330, 343 (1978). For the possibility
that this phenomenon resulted from the exploitation of "availability cascades" by
"availability entrepreneurs," see Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 687 (1999) (discussing
availability entrepreneurs' focus on large punitive damages awards in order to win
support for tort reform).
Of course, some interested observers have pointed out, without attempting to
quantify, the benefits that could be lost in discovery retrenchment. E.g., Jack H.
Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 819-20 (1981); Paul D.
Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51 (1997); Patrick
Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1997).
4. See Reda, supra note 3, at 1102, 1122-23.
5. For a summary of the Proposed Rules as approved for publication and
comment in 2013, see REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2013.pdf. For the Proposed
Rules that were submitted to and approved by the Judicial Conference in 2014, see
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULE OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE (2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf.
6. See Inadequate Court Resources Hurt Access to Justice, Say Nation's Top
Jurists, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/
2013/08/inadequate_courtres.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
The author attended this American Bar Association Showcase Program.
Although other panelists discussed the effect of resource constraints and the high
costs of legal representation on access to court, Judge Sutton, the Chair of the
Standing Committee, repeatedly touted the Advisory Committee's discovery
proposals.
7. Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 1, at 6.
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"spring[] from a view that certain favored types of litigation bring
substantial social benefits that are external to the litigants
themselves."
8
The recent work by Sean Farhang that the authors cite for this
proposition9 makes clear that the standard Chamber of Commerce
anti-litigation narrative, of which the discovery abuse story is
an important chapter, is radically incomplete, if not simply wrong.'
0
Farhang's work shows a tight correlation between the large increase
in federal civil litigation that started in the late 1960s and
the incidence of statutory fee-shifting or multiple damages
provisions.1' It also demonstrates, both quantitatively and
qualitatively, that congressional decisions to include such provisions
were animated by concern, in periods of divided government, that
exclusive reliance on public enforcement would put the new
substantive rights that Congress created across the entire federal
regulatory landscape at risk of subversion by an ideologically
distant Executive.'
2
The original Federal Rules on discovery reflected the social,
political, and jurisprudential views of those who fashioned
them. Their primary architect was Edson Sunderland, a member of
the Advisory Committee, not the Committee's Reporter, Charles
Clark. Sunderland was a Progressive before he was a legal realist,
and he embraced the Progressives' campaign for "legibility,"
a central tenet of which was that effective regulation requires
adequate information about the subject of regulation.13 Thus, it is
no surprise that the 1938 discovery rules favored private
enforcement even when that phenomenon was much more sparingly
encouraged as a tool of federal regulatory policy.14  It is also
no surprise that, when the Advisory Committee turned back to the
8. Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 1, at 6.
9. See id. at 6 n. 11 (citing SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC
REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010); Burbank & Farhang,
Litigation Reform, supra note 2).
10. See FARHANG, supra note 9, at 13-14, 69; Burbank & Farhang, Litigation
Reform, supra note 2, at 1586.
11. See Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 2, at 1548 (Figure
1).
12. See FARHANG, supra note 9, passim; Burbank & Farhang, Litigation
Reform, supra note 2, at 1547-50.
13. See Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 2, at 1583-85.
14. See FARHANG, supra note 9, at 66 (Figure 3.1).
Symposium 2015] 649
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION
discovery rules in the late 1960s, their efforts made the rules
even more favorable to private enforcement.15  Evidence of
the effectiveness of private enforcement was mounting, and with it,
awareness of how central broad discovery is to that effectiveness. 16
The Supreme Court is fond of reminding us that Congress
legislates against the background of the Federal Rules,17 which, in a
world of both the goose and the gander, means not only that
Congress is deemed to be aware of the procedural rules with which
its statutes will interact (and must clearly manifest an intent to
displace them), but that it may rely on those rules in devising
regulatory policy. To be sure, those responsible for rulemaking
under the Enabling Act 18 are not forever saddled with their
predecessors' policy choices.'9  In considering different policy
choices about discovery, however, the rule makers must recognize
that the social benefits "external to litigants themselves"20 are not
mere abstractions or the stuff of formal models. They are the
intended fruits of conscious legislative policy. If discovery
retrenchment results in substantially less enforcement of federal
statutes, who will take up the slack, and how will the alternative
15. See Burbank & Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking, supra note 2, at
1566.
16. See Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 2, at 1588-89
(discussing 1971 memorandum written by Lewis Powell for the Chamber of
Commerce and Justice Powell's 1980 dissent from "tinkering changes" to the
discovery rules); Carrington, supra note 3; Higginbotham, supra note 3.
17. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 672, 700 (1979) ("We do not
find in § 205(g) the necessary clear expression of congressional intent to exempt
actions brought under that statute from the operation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.").
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-75 (2012).
19. For evidence that the changes to the Enabling Act process in the 1980s
resulted in part from the desire of certain interest groups and legislators to protect
pro-access, pro-private-enforcement Federal Rules from consequential
amendment, see Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 2, at 1595-97;
cf McNollgast & Daniel R. Rodriguez, Administrative Law Agonistes, 108
COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 15, 15-16 (2008) ("[A] serious normative dispute
remains about whether and to what extent [an] enacting coalition should be
preferred over the current coalition in Congress. In the end, it is one thing to say
that Congress tries to stack the deck in favor of certain interests and policies; it is
another thing to say that we ought to let Congress get away with it.").
20. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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enforcement be paid for?21  Put otherwise, the social benefits of
discovery in policy areas where Congress has sought to stimulate
private enforcement include avoiding the large expenditures, higher
taxes, and bureaucratic state-building that are essential to adequate
public enforcement.22 This assumes, of course, that those who favor
discovery retrenchment share the regulatory goals of the Congresses
that deployed private enforcement regimes.
23
Business does not like legibility, and it does not like
24regulation. However, it is difficult to quash a subpoena from
a federal agency. If proportionality is not to become a deregulatory
tool in cases in which federal regulatory policy is implicated,
21. "Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of enforcement of the
social policy set by Congress." Higginbotham, supra note 3, at 5. "Unless
corresponding new powers are conferred on public officers, constricting discovery
would diminish the disincentives for lawless behavior across a wide spectrum of
forbidden conduct." Carrington, supra note 3, at 54.
22. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 662-63 (2013) (discussing
potential advantages of private enforcement, including the fact that it "shift[s] the
costs of regulation off of governmental budgets and onto the private sector").
As compared to constructing and financing bureaucratic regulatory
enforcement machinery and endowing it with coercive powers, for
example, to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and issue cease-and-desist
orders, an enforcement regime that is founded instead on allowing
aggrieved persons to prosecute their own complaints in court may be
likely to attract broader support. If there are pivotal lawmakers prepared
to obstruct enactment of regulatory policy that entails bureaucratic
state-building, utilizing private enforcement regimes may facilitate
overcoming such obstructions.
Id. at 666.
23. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
24. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" a Little More:
Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 254 (1999)
("The tie between discovery and enforcement is no coincidence, and assuredly not
a surprise to those groups seeking change. Business groups seek to limit discovery
precisely because those limits will make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in
products liability suits. Having failed to pass substantive tort reform legislation,
these groups seek procedural advantage; if the law cannot be changed, maybe it
can be made unenforceable." (footnotes omitted)).
25. See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking:
Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 606-10 (2010) (arguing that "the
motives of many of those seeking reform of discovery practice were primarily
Symposium 2015]
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judges must resist the temptation to privilege costs over benefits, and
private over public interests. The temptation is great because
one naturally tends to focus on the interests of those who are present
to the detriment of the interests of those who are absent,26 and
on variables that appear quantifiable over those that do not.27 It may
also be great at a time when the Supreme Court's decisions
"interpreting" the Federal Rules are more inflected with ideology
than their decisions about matters much more obviously central
to private enforcement,28  when the chance of securing
a pro-enforcement decision from the Court has declined
precipitously to match the voting record on those issues of
conservative Justices, 29 and when the chance of securing a pro-
enforcement proposal from the Advisory Committee in 2011 was
precisely zero.30  These circumstances cast in relief the numerous
parts of proportionality analysis that, as Professors Gelbach and
substantive rather than procedural: they sought economic advancement, perhaps
especially their own, if at the cost of decreasing civil justice").
26. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 137-45 (2011)
(discussing the availability heuristic); Fischoff, et al., supra note 3, at 333, 343
(describing experimental support for the availability hypothesis, "that what is out
of sight is also out of mind"); supra note 3 ("availability cascades").
27. See Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 1, at 16-17 (discussing difficulties
of "quantifying benefits implicated by intrinsically nonquantifiable factors");
Reda, supra note 3, at 1122-23. For experimental research testing the
"evaluability hypothesis," which "shows that when two options involving a
trade-off between a hard-to-evaluate attribute and an easy-to-evaluate attribute are
evaluated, preference between these options may change depending on whether
these options are presented jointly or separately" and that "the direction of this
change can be predicted, and can even be manipulated," see Christopher K. Hsee,
The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals Between
Joint and Separate Evaluation of Alternatives, 67 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 256 (1996).
28. See Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 2, at 1571-80,
1606-12 ("The effect of ideology in Federal Rules cases went from about half the
effect in other private enforcement cases in the 1970-1994 period, to about the
same in the 1995-2013 period. Indeed, . after 2000 ideology had a materially
larger effect in the Federal Rules cases.").
29. See id. at 1574, 1609.
30. See Burbank & Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking, supra note 2, at
1579 ("After increasing in the early 1960s, the predicted probability that a
proposed amendment would favor plaintiffs declined from 88 percent in 1963 to
zero by the end of the series.").
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Kobayashi point out, inescapably tap into the normative views of
judges.3'
I have considered recommending that rulemaking under the
Enabling Act be brought within the larger world of delegated federal
legislation32 by subjecting some proposals to a requirement of formal
cost-benefit analysis. I have not done so because such analysis of
federal regulations under the pertinent legislative and executive
requirements has proved to be difficult and inconsistent,33 because
the rulemakers lack the information and qualifications to conduct
it,34 and because, even if they did not, such a requirement would be
31. See Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 1, at 16-18 ("[T]he proportionality
standard . . . provides judges with explicit equitable discretion to consider
normative issues... that implicate justice, speed, and expense.").
32. On federal court rulemaking under the Enabling Act as an exercise of
delegated legislative power (as opposed to "inherent power"), see Stephen B.
Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1677, 1679-89 (2004).
33. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Patrick Dudley, How Well Does the
Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis? (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 04-01, 2006), available at https://www.law
.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/regulation/papers/hahnpaper.pdf.
The authors of this empirical study of cost-benefit analyses of federal
regulations found that "[t]he RIAs [Regulatory Impact Analyses] did not present
estimates of benefits as consistently as costs .... While 100 percent of the RIAs
monetized at least some costs, only half that number monetized at least some
benefits. The number of RIAs that quantified at least some benefits was
significantly higher-exceeding 80 percent for all three administrations. This
suggests that some benefits are not easily monetized and/or that the agency is
reluctant to monetize some benefits." Id. at 11. In a footnote, the authors observe:
"Benefits are considered to be quantified if they are expressed in some countable
unit, such as dollars, lives saved or tons of pollution reduced. They are considered
monetized if those units are assigned monetary values. Note that monetization
implies quantification, but not vice versa." Id. at 11 n.36. For the legal
requirements governing cost-benefit analyses of federal regulations, see id. at 4
("To encourage the development of more effective and efficient regulations,
Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have directed agencies to perform economic
analyses of major regulations that show whether a regulation's benefits are likely
to exceed its costs and whether alternatives to that regulation are more effective or
less costly.").
34. Of course, the rulemakers' disabilities in this respect pale in comparison
to those of the Supreme Court when amending Federal Rules in the guise of
interpreting them in order to resolve a case. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading
and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 116
(2009) ("The Court acting as such under Article III was even less well-positioned
to estimate the procedural costs and benefits of a general rule of plausible
Symposium 2015] 653
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION
the source of substantial delay in a process that is already lengthy.
If, however, proportionality is not to be window dressing or a cloak
for deregulation, similar challenges are unavoidable, and they will be
presented in adjudication, not rulemaking, which is to say, again and
again. Even more than in rulemaking, there is danger that
case-by-case cost-benefit calculations will give short shrift to those
elements of the analysis that, because they are out of sight, are also
out of mind, or are difficult to quantify-in particular, social
benefits.
pleading, let alone the non-procedural costs and benefits of such a rule,
substance-specific or general.").
654 [Vol. 34:4
